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I INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
1 Introduction to European Competition Law
The competition field is an essential element of the
European market construction. An efficient policy in this
field is the "sine qua non" condition of the success of the
European industrial challenge.^ The 1989 European regulation^
on the "control of merger operations" is a major step in the
elaboration of the European concentration policy. This
4064/89 regulation provides for prior notification and
control of concentrations (mergers, acquisitions, and
certain joint ventures)
.
Sir Leon Brittan has said that, with this regulation,
"we have passed an historic step in the Common market". ^ The
aim of the new regulation is to introduce some uniformity
and clarity at the European level, in order to avoid the
superposition of the national legislations. The text is
based on the presumption that now there is only one global
merger control for every country in the E.C: there is a "one
stop shop", or a "same level playing field" for everybody.
This regulation is the reaffirmation of the Member
State's commitment to the goal of the Common Market, and an
event of major importance in Community law. It is a new
1
legal instrument that goes beyond those provided for in
Articles 85 and 86, for the evaluation and control of
concentrations. So, this regulation in providing for new
procedures replaces the previous ones. Before the Merger
regulation. Article 85 of the Rome Treaty was the only
available competition policy instrument to reach tansactions
involving no preexisting dominant position.
The "White Book" with its 3 00 measures in favor of the
interior market did not mention the project of regulation
that was born only in the sixties.^ In 1973, however,
controversies about the need for a regulation at a European
level became stronger. In fact, some people were in favor of
a strict merger control that would save the competitive
market structures and others preferred an industrial policy.
From the beginning, the European Commission has called
for a specific merger control^ as the Rome Treaty contains
no explicit merger regulation.^ The Commission, therefore,
used to apply the general competition rules of the Rome
Treaty when dealing with mergers. It used to interpret
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty as a means to condemn
mergers that would lead to an abuse of a dominant position
at a European level . "^ With the use of Articles 85 and 86 for
mergers, there is an absence of complete and systematic
control as far as structural modifications resulting from
the concentration. 8 Not only does the Treaty itself give
scarce guidance for the elaboration of such a system, but
there does not seem to be an evidence that the Framers had
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the will to set up a merger control regulation. ^ Contrary to
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, Article 235 set the
basis of the new regulation; ^^ creating new substantive
rules and broadening considerably the scope of the text.
Due to the impressive acceleration of merger movements
in the eighties, the adoption of a new regulation was a must
to attempt to define a common and uniform economic policy.
H
With the increasing numbers of concentrations, there has
been a feeling that it was necessary to see if the
restructuring of the enterprises would not prejudice trade.
In fact, the problem is that mergers can easily lead to
"national champions" that are able to harm the European
market integration, or to lead to "supply and demand"
structures too tight to maintain an effective concurrence . ^2
The philosophy of the regulation lies on the
presumption that concentrations that do not have a European
market will not affect trade between Member States. These
kinds of concentration operations will then be covered by
the States' own policy ;-^-^ the European size mergers will be
handled by the Commission. The regulation does not, however,
disinguish between the enterprises. They will be in constant
relationship with the Commission during the procedure; the
State authorities will also play an important role.l'^
Two different attitudes were at issue in the creation
of a new regulation in the merger field. ^^ The first trend
was to fire out the mergers that raised the market share of
the resulting combine above an acceptable limit ;1^ allowing
no discrimination on the possible welfare gains and
losses.^' The second stand-point calls for an investigation
by the public Authorities of the advantages and
disadvantages resulting from the concentration through a
costs/benefits analysis. ^^ The spirit of the 1989
regulation seems closer to this second position.
In fact, the Commission will try to set up an analysis
(while assessing or not the proposed merger) that balances
two different conceptions: the integration of the national
markets and the maintenance of the competition process. ^^
2 Introduction to the notions involved in the Single
Market Construction
An understanding of the notions involved in the
European Single Market construction is necessary, to see the
challenges the Community faces. Article 3.G of the Rome
Treaty^*^ says that the Community has to establish a non-
altered system of competition. The goal of a unified market
dominated the process of construction of this system and is
still the central impetus of the "new Europe". 21
When the Rome Treaty was adopted, the Member States
were still recovering from the ravages of the second World
War, and the economic integration was widely viewed as
necessary for a rapid economic growth. A perfectly
integrated market allows the firms to acquire sufficient
size to compete effectively on world markets, and consumers
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benefit from a larger market with its concomitant economies
of scale. 22 Therefore, in addition to the political goal of
replacing conflict with cooperation, the Common market was
seen as having a variety of economic goals based on economic
cooperation. 23
In this "single" market, the enterprises have gained
new liberties: the right to sell, buy goods or services, to
establish, and to open subsidiariess troughout the
Community.
Since the Maastricht Treaty, the main issue has been
the nature of the competition policy lead at a European
level. 24 There have been many controversies as to whether an
industrial policy would be compatible with a competition
philosophy. Ever since this regulation was adopted, it seems
that the Commission, helped by the European Council, has
chosen an industrial policy that tries not to contradict
with a competition philosophy. 25 The adoption of the 1989
regulation has not been easy.
Various reasons explain the length of the negotiations.
One of them is that the competition field and especially
the merger area, deals with the sovereignty of the States:
and each State is willing to decide its economic policy for
itself. The creation of a regulation imposing a European
uniform control system would oblige the States to put such a
control, at least partially, in the hands of the Commission.
There also has always been a fear from the part of the
Sates, that the Commission would deal with internal
6
industrial policy decisions. ^6 one of the most reticent
countries, Great Britain feared for its independence and
refused the very principle of a European merger control
system. In fact, most countries were afraid of the European
administration (especially Germany) , and many European
countries wanted to limit the Commission's role to the
drafting for each merger of a "social and economic
analysis". This analysis would enable the countries to see
if there is an abuse of dominant power on the market.
Another reason for the hesitation is that certain
countries already had their own system of merger control.
For instance. West Germany (the Bundeskartellamt) and Great
Britain (the Department of "Trade and Industry", and the
"Merger and Monopoly" Commission) had already some very
elaborate systems, and did not wish to lose any control over
that matter. 27
In the end, the adoption of this regulation was done at
the Commission's insistence and so, by its very nature, the
1989 regulation is more a political compromise than a
technical one.^^ Every country did agree, however, that the
broadest meaning of the "merger operation" should prevail,
regardeless of their jurisdictional modality. ^9 The new
regulation fills one of the gaps of the Rome Treaty in
creating a special regime for the European size
concentrations and giving the Commission the power to handle
European size mergers.
7
The most important change brought about, in comparison
with Commission practice before 1989, is that the merger
control takes place when the firms are about to realize the
agreement, and not after. ^'-* This is because the regulation
Drafters have noticed that an "a posteriori" control was
insufficient, and thus established an "a priori" control. -^^
The enterprise "notification" avoids the damaging
effects of a sanction that would apply after, and is much
safer for the enterprise management. In fact, the new
regulation is favorable to the mergers, when they lead to an
economic progress for the whole Community . -^^
This "favorable" state of mind leads the Commission to
presume that the potential mergers produce gains in
efficiency; it estimates that, in general, these mergers
produce a diminution of costs and lead to a increased
competition inside and outside the Community . -^-^ The
philosophy of the 1989 regulation is that if there is an
effective competition, the gains in efficacy resulting from
the merger must be effectively realized and shared equitably
with the consumers . -^^ For that reason, the regulation does
not forbid all trade restrictions or all substantial
restrictions (the US Antitrust Law disagrees with this view-
point) . The E.C competition law merely attempts to restrict
dominant positions that adversely affect competition.-^^ In
spite of the controversy surrounding the drafting of this
regulation and its practical shortfalls, the text is now
8
seen as a means to assure the competitveness of the European
industries and the harmonious development of the Community.
3 Introduction to the notion of relevant market
An abuse of dominant power, however, has to be found on
a "reference" market. It is in fact impossible to check if a
concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position
without positioning this concentration on a "relevant"
market, A market is the space where enterprises operate in
homogenous concurrence conditions, providing products or
services considered interchangeable by consumers . -^ ^ It will
be necessary, therefore, to identify the products (or
services) of all concerned enterprises that are
interchangeable in a certain geographic area.-^"^
The heart of the issue is that it is not possible to
decide whether a merger will be abusive, without knowing
what could be affected. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out
that the determination of the relevant market is not an end
in itself; it is merely a tool integrated in the merger
control. In fact, a great emphasis has been placed on the
accurate determination of the definition of the market in
order to determine the assessment of a merger. ^^
The Commission's approach to the relevant market is
clearly shown in the Sabena case. 3 9 In this case, the
Commission showed appreciation for the economic power of the
undertakings by scrutinizing all fungible products subject
9
to uniform competition in a given geographic area. It is
stil not possible, however, to see what importance the
Commission gives to the criteria eniimerated in the 1989
regulation, in determining the relevant market. ^'-'
This study will investigate whether the determination
of the relevant market is the right method to get a fair
idea of the degree of power of a merger. Has the Commission
turned to a less classical analysis of the relevant market?
What are the main changes in comparison with the period
before 1989? Chapter 1 that the 1989 merger regulation is a
major step in the European integration. Chapter 2 will
discuss the importance of an accurate determination of the
relevant market. Finally, Chapter 3 will show that the
Commission has felt the need for an evolution, and has taken
into account factors that do not include only the product
and geographic markets. The question will be answered
whether these factors are new criteria or if they constitute
independent economic theories that are able to appreciate
with enough accuracy the potential dominance of a merger. A
fundamental distinction to be kept in mind: there is a
difference between the operation of determination of the
market, and the investigation of the different elements
found during the first step. Such a distinction is made
because the Commission will often choose to highlight some
specific element discovered in the determination operation,
and ignore others. Most important to this study, however, is
the initial step: the determination of the relevant market..
II THE 1989 REGULATION: A MAJOR STEP IN EUROPEAN
MERGER LAW
1 A More Political than Technical Compromise
With the 1989 regulation, the Community institutions
have been reinforced because the States have transferred
part of their sovereignty.'^-^ The Commission's task, is to
scrutinize sometimes complex strategies in order to
distinguish between the useful concentrations and those that
have an anti-competitive impact. Since this regulation,
firms have had to make a special effort to give the
Commission more detailed and substantial explanations to
justify their strategy. ^^ The "notification" paper is issued
to the Commission for this purpose. A balance between the
powers of the Commission and the rights of the relevant
States or Enterprises has been very difficult to establish
respect to the threshold levels and to the investigation in
the relevant national firms. ^-^
A New Definitions
The European Commission is competent for the
appreciation of the European size mergers, and exceptionally
10
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so for mergers that do not have a European size in a case
where a State does not have any national merger
Legislation.^'^ The European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee have insisted that an "exclusive"
jurisdiction be attributed to the Commission, in order to
avoid a double- jurisdiction (European and National). ^^ The
1989 regulation has brought about some new definitions, that
will be most important for the determination of the relevant
market, and has clarified the meaning of a "European size
concentration that harms the competition"
.
a "Concentration"
The regulation establishes a large and pragmatic
definition of the merger operations. Article 3 encompasses
not only the fusions but also all the acts that allow an
enterprise to develop or take the control of, or to get a
determinant influence on an enterprise. '^^ Numerous merger
operations are susceptible to be covered by the regulation.
The essential element for the Commission is whether the
acquisition of the firm is motivated by the wish for the
relevant enterprises to determine the behavior of another
firm. 47
Many controversies have arisen as far as the notion of
"common" enterprise. Paragraph 2 of the regulation clearly
makes a distinction between the Common Enterprise and the
Cooperative Enterprise: the "merger" does not grasp the
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operations that coordinate the competitive behavior of the
enterprise that remains independent. The gap of the
regulation however, is the absence of qualification of the
"cooperative" enterprise . ^^ A "common enterprise" is an
entity formed by an agreement between enterprises which
results in a joint control over activities . '^^ Concentrated
joint ventures will be handled exclusively by the merger
regulation, and "cooperative" operations will be reviewed
under Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty.
It has been determined that the 1989 regulation will
not apply when two parents concur now or in the future
(because of the risk of coordination between the two mother
societies) or when the mother societies are not concurring
now nor in the future and none of them is active on the
Market of the Common Enterprise (because there is no risk of
horizontal nor vertical coordination).^'-' The 1989 regulation
will apply when either both of the mother societies are not
concurring but one of both mother societies remains active
on the Market of the Common enterprise (and only if the
mother society actively deals with the activity of the
common enterprise) .^^ The common enterprise is not any more
an independent enterprise than the active mother society. ^^
For the moment, there have been no precise guidelines that
fill the gaps of the 1989 text.
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"of European size"
The European-size mergers are not numerous; between
sixty and a hundred each year.^-^ Article 1, Paragraph 2 of
the 1989 Regulation defines precisely what the Commission
will consider in its investigation as a "European- size"
merger. ^^ If the potential merger has a European size, the
Commission will then be competent. If the merger instead has
an impact on the territory of one of the member states, the
Commission will be ousted from its jurisdiction. The
importance of this distinction must be emphasized, as the
enterprises have a natural tendency to fall under the 1989
regulation instead of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome
Treaty. ^^ This desire is the result of the Commission's
propensity to accept operations under the new regulation.
The area of concentration is found by gathering of all the
enterprises that participate in the operations either
directly or because of their appurtenance to the group they
form with the participant enterprises.
The specificity of this regulation is obvious here as
there is not a unique method that aids the Commission in
deciding if the potential merger has a European "dimension".
The method will vary from case to case depending upon the
kind of activity of the relevant enterprise. For instance,
in the Promodes case, a specific computation (based on gross
premium issued) was chosen as the relevant method to
14
deteirmine the scope of the merger^^ in the field of
insurance companies
.
Practically, the method is one of computing the
turnovers as specified in Article 5 of the 1989
regulation. ^"7 The world turnover shows the economical and
financial power of the participants; the European turnover
is related to the activity level. The "transnational"
criteria added to the means that mergers with a national
impact will be excluded. ^°
As there have been many controversies concerning the
too-high thresholds, the principal floor lowered down to 2
billion ECU in 1993 (the 1989 regulation has to be reviewed
every four years and 1993 was the year of revision). ^^ A
very high floor translates the political compromise that
took place instead of a technical compromise; this was done
to satisfy the States that wanted to limit Commission
intervention.^^ The more important Member States have
succeeded in imposing thresholds even higher than those
proposed by the Commission. °-^ It might be pointed out,
however, that even under these thresholds, a state can ask
the Commission to handle the merger if the concentration
harms the intra-Community trade. ^2 jn ^ny event, an
important trend states that the Commission has the right to
intervene because of Article 89 of the Rome Treaty, even
under the threshold. ^-^
The Council of the European Community does not agree
with this opinion because it says that when a concentration
15
is under the threshold, it cannot affect the intra-European
trade. ^'^ Paradoxically, the Commission has dealt with more
and more merger operations over the years , because of the
speed of the augmentation of the big group aggregate
turnovers. ^^ The interpretation of the regulation as far as
computing the turnovers, is that every mother society is
considered as a "relevant enterprise" . ^^ Otherwise, a lot of
community enterprises would escape the application of the
regulation, in spite of the combination of the resources of
the mother societies in the enterprise that is conjointly
controlled. ^'^
c "that harms the competition"
Article 2 of the regulation defines the harm to the
competition. ^S This Article is not merely a condition of
application of the 1989 regulation, but is considered as an
help to see the compatibility of the proposed merger with
the common market. °° Only the main elements of qualitative
nature have been enumerated: they are the traditional
factors pointed out by the Commission in its view-points . "^^
The Commission, in making its appraisal will take into
account, among other elements, the need to maintain and
develop effective competition within the Common Market, the
market position of the undertakings concerned and their
economic and financial power, and the interest of the
ultimate cons\imers . Article 2 creates an irrefutable
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presumption of incompatibility against merger operations
that impede effective competition. The word "to
significantly impede the competition" in the Common Market
(Article 2.3) is very vague and so the Commission had to
clarify its analysis, "^^
The 1989 regulation has been the result of a political
compromise because the United Kingdom and the Commission who
wanted to limit the scrutinization of the mergers to pure
competition law issues: but in fact, the countries that
wanted the creation of a real global policy in this field
have imposed their view-point
.
'^^ So, other factors than
competition elements may be taken into account. "^-^ A
concentration that creates or strengthen a dominant position
is deemed to cause an effective and significant harm to the
competition.'^^ The Hoffman Laroche and Michelin cases have
set up a definition of a dominant position, that have
survived the 1989 Regulation, and still apply in the
European jurisprudence. '^
A dominant position occurs when an enterprise to harm
the effective competition by having the capacity to act in
an appreciable measure, independently from the other
competitors, or clients. "^^ For example, the power to fix
price is superior to the "competition prices" without that
the diminution of the sells (likely to happen), stops the
augmentation of the profits hoped, the enterprise has a
dominant position. "^^ In fact, the monopoly power is directly
in function of the elasticity of the supply and demand
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trend. The more the demand trend is insensible to price
variations (non-elasticity of the demand) , the more it is
difficult for other distributors to adapt their production
in order to satisfy the same need (non-elasticity of the
supply) , the more the product power is considered to be
important . "^^ The dominant position implicates that the
enterprise be a leader on the market and controls
effectively the price formation. In sum, an enterprise that
attracts by its price augmentation, attracts on the spot new
competitors is not necessarily in dominant position. The
supply test measures the contestability of the position that
is likely to be dominant. '^^
Two conditions for the competition to be harmed are
necessary. First, the potential merger has to harm the
**effective" competition.^^ The European Treaty on Coal and
Steel (C.E.C.A) had already elaborated the notion of harm
to the "effective" competition, but the meaning remained
unclear. ^^ So, the Commission had to clarify the meaning of
this word. The Akso case brought about a clear definition
that remains valid for the other cases. It stated that an
harm to the effective competition is "the possibility to
eliminate or diminish seriously the existence of competitors
or, to impeach some potential competitors to enter the
market". ^2 Tj^e method is far from being a "per se
presumption" against every kind of mergers. The word
"effective" has been analyzed as being similar to
"efficient", in an actual or potential way.°-^
18
The second condition is the "significant" character of
the harm. The Community has not taken the U.S. A or German
experience, to clarify and define the significant character
of the harm.^^ In the States (indice Herfindalh) or in
Germany (presumption of incompatibility: numbered
computation of market shares) , the relevant Authorities can
rapidly get an accurate idea of the situation. ^^ Instead,
the Community has chosen an "in concrete" analysis of the
"significant" harm. In case of a doubt, the compatibility
will be declared. ^^
This criterion of "concentration that creates or
strengthens a dominant position" is rather similar to the
one that figures at Article 86 of the Rome Treaty because,
in practice, the Commission only sees if there is an
augmentation of a dominant position, and skips the
deteirmination of the creation of a dominant position. °' In
fact, the Commission will not check thoroughly the existence
of a dominant position. ^° Nonetheless, there have been a lot
of cases where a two-step analysis has been effectuated.
For instance, in the De Havilland case, after having
showed the existence of a dominant position, the Commission
asked if there was a compatibility with the Common market. ^^
The general trend today is that the regulation has to be
read in a spirit of "Common Law" : all the criterions are
applied in only one analysis. ^0 The Commission has to prove
in concreto what the practical inconveniences of the actual
situation are.^^ The Autonec case defined what is exactly
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the Coininission challenge in the new regulation: the
Commission has, among other elements, to balance the
importance of the alleged infractions for the functioning of
the Community market, the probability of the power to
establish its existence, and the width its investing
measures. ^2 The decision is difficult to take, because there
are political, economic, and judicial interests to take into
account
.
^^
B A New Procedure
We will see that a more balanced juridical and
economical approach has been put up. This is because the
Commission has been criticized for a too juridical view-
point when it applied Articles 85 and 86 to European size
concentrations. The Group "Task Force" that was integrated
to the "Direction Generale" (General Direction or D.G 4) has
forty five people who work full time for the merger field
and is a great help for the Commission in the handling of
these operations.
a The Prior Notification to the Commission
First of all, a prior notification from the concerned
enterprises must be sent to the Commission. ^'^ A less
bureaucratic and a more informal approach with preliminary
discussions can be decided instead of notifying. In this
20
case, the enterprise needs tc give enough time for the
Coitimission to check the concentration.^^
The nature of this prior notification is mandatory and
has a suspensive effect on the operation. In this view-
point, the 1989 regulation is similar to the C.E.C.A Treaty,
but the regulation is more complete because the decisions
taken must be published. ^^ The notification must come before
the realization of this European size merger: this is an
improvement in comparison with the Rome Treaty. What is
really original about the notification is that the relevant
enterprises will have to appreciate themselves of the size
of the merger operation. They will decide in fact, if the
operation is worth notifying. In order to be on time to
deliver its decision, the Commission obliges the enterprises
to use the "CO." paper to notify the merger.^'
The Commission will have the essential information and
will not lose time asking for more elements. The
notification will not take effect if the CO. paper is not
correctly fulfilled. ^^ The Commission has the possibility to
take more time if it needs it, in order to scrutinize the
relevant operation. ^^
b The exclusivity of the Commission competence
The real challenge of this regulation was to try to
find a balance between the Community competence and the
states interventionism. 10^ This exclusive attribution of
21
jurisdiction is similar to the one in Article 85 Paragraph 3
of the Rome Treaty and in Article 9(1) of the 17
regulation. 101 The Parliament particularly insisted on
having a "one stop shop" because it found it crucial in a
more and more integrated market. ^^^ The idea is to create a
unique forum for European size mergers, and to guarantee
equal treatment of the European economic operations . l*-*-^ The
investigation will be lead by the Commission with the help
of the national authorities!'^'^ -pj^^e intervention powers of
the Commission are limited to Article 89 of the European
Treaty. ^^^
The Commission is qualified to give its opinion as
well, for state-size mergers: because a state can request
that the Commission intervene for any kind of merger that
will significantly impede competition within the territory
of a state member, 1*^^and at the request of third party the
Commission should have a look at the concentration. 1^'
There are exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commission: the States can take back their competence in
order to protect their own interests . 1^° This provision is
the result of a compromise, and was accepted because Germany
insisted on having it.^^^
c The Scope of the Commission Decisions
After engaging a procedure, the Commission will issue a
final decisionll'^ of compatibility or incompatibility,m
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with or without charges . ^^ j^ 80% of the cases, the
Commission has said that the concentration was compatible
with the Common Market . ^^•^ The system of exemption by
category shows the favorable position of the Commission vis-
a-vis small enterprises that it allows to develop without
being confronted with artificial barriers from its
competitors, distributors, and clients. ^^^ The Commission
has the power to oblige the relevant enterprises to modify
the initial merger project . -^-^^
The Commissioncan can also revoke its decision when the
declaration of compatibility is based on incorrect
information, or if the firms have committed a breach of one
of the obligations attached to the decision. The Commission
has also the power to require the undertakings or the assets
brought together to be separated (...) in order to restore
the conditions of effective competition when a concentration
has not already been implemented. ^^^ A fee of maximum 10% of
the firm turnover can be required by the Commission if the
enterprise has realized the operation "nihil obstaf'-^^"^
As far as rejections, the Commission can decide that
the operation is merely not a concentration operation, as in
the Baxter Nestle Salvia case, for instance. ^^ It will
notify that this operation does not fall in the scope of the
1989 regulation by means of a decision. ^^ Another rejection
can be made if the merger does not have a "European- s i ze "
:
the Arjomari Prioux case and Renault-Volvo cases are
particularly relevant. ^^^
23
In fact, the Commission is merely immixing in the
economic field, because it has the possibility to impose
obligations and to advise the undertakings as far as their
mergers. That is why there have been a lot of controversies
as whether to give the merger control to an autonomous
office. 121 ]^Q must bear in mind that the Commission has the
duty to decide according to the principle of
proportionality, and that the enterprises have finally the
power to decide for themselves : ^^2 the risk of arbitrary
behaviors and decisions are less important.
The original side of the regulation is that there are
informal discussions between the Commission and the relevant
parties as to the modifications to bring about for merger
operations: this avoids the Commission to refuse the
operation, and it is time saving for the enterprise. The
parties can then decide to modify their agreement before a
decision. ^23
d The Subsidiarity Principle
The subsidiarity principle is implicit in the 1989
regulation: article 9 establishes a referral procedure to
the competent authorities of the Member States, l^*^ This
article allows the Commission to send back the European size
concentrations to a Member State when this merger raises
competition issues in a market situated inside this State
Member. Up to now there have only been five demands for
24
referrals: four in Germany and one in Great Britain. ^^^ The
only referral the Commission has accepted was in the
Steetley v. Tarmac case^2 6 but, it has refused them in the
four other cases because of an absence of "threat
domination" on the distinct market. The Member States
acknowledge the usefulness of the referral and most of them
wish that this possibility be enlarged with the diminishing
of the thresholds level. -^^"^ Since the Automec case, the
Commission has discretionary power to accept to study more
the complaints . ^2^ A proposition concerning the
subsidiarity principle has been made that it would be more
logical if the Commission could be competent whenever the
potential merger has significant effects on other markets,
or when several national authorities are concerned by the
same operation. 129 This solution would avoid a multiplicity
of controls.
The Jurisdiction safety is perfectly insured because,
if the Commission does not act within the delays, (one month
for the engagement of procedure after the
notification) , ^•^'^ : the concentration will be deemed to be
compatible with the 1989 regulation. As far as defense
rights, the 1989 regulation improves the situation in
allowing auditions and an easy access to the files. ^-^^ In
practice, nonetheless, the Commission does not formally have
to invite them to show their view-point, but the Commission
stays closely linked with the enterprises after the
notification, to settle the legal or factual problems.
25
C Six years of Regulation Application
Some Authors have said that the 1989 regulation was too
much of a compromise text, making its scope difficult to
determine. The continuing high level of the thresholds, the
implicit immixions of the State Members (politically-
interested in the Commission decisions) show this aspect. ^-^^
The democratic deficit that allowed the creation of this
regulation, was also very much criticized. ^^^ The high
threshold is a strong limitation of the Commission scope of
action, because it that can not handle small but substantial
mergers
.
Dark areas exist because some words have an unclear
meaning in spite of the regulation efforts. For instance,
there is no precise meaning for "technical progress", and a
lot of words are susceptible to multiple interpretations.
Many aspects of the 1989 regulation show that the text is
the product of a political compromise and is in fact an
"ambivalent" piece of legislation which does not seem to
clarify the merger field. Some Authors have said that the
European authorities should be more flexible as far as
finding the dominant position, and its potential abuse on
the dominant market
.
The American attitude considering that every
concentration does not necessarily harm the concurrence is
influencing somewhat the Community . ^^'^ There is also a wish
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to analyze the market with more flexibility . ^^^ Some Authors
have said that the Commission should do an economic analysis
instead of analyzing the competition effects of a merger and
should broaden its view-point by analyzing more the
competitivity of the European enterprises on the world
market. The issue of each potential merger is uncertain: so,
most of the time it is necessary to wait for the Commission
final decision to know exactly. ^-^^
As a whole, the existing system is seen by the majority
of the Authors as having flaws and a solution has been
proposed to change the regulation meaning to try not to
consider every joint venture as potentially "worse". In
fact, there is an uncertainty about he substantive rules
established by the 1989 regulation: the dual application of
National and Community competition, the test for dominance
and compatibility, the definition of concentrative joint
venture (...) . The Commission faces the question whether
there are improvements to be done. The first ones proposed
by the Doctrine deal with the very controversial definition
"concentration- cooperation" .137
The positive elements brought about by the 1989
regulation are far more important than its side effects. The
fear of competence conflicts that existed at the beginning
is in fact no longer present. These fears have disminished
with the development of national competition policies and
the less important State role in the enterprises
restructuration. 13^ The control of the European Court of
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Justice is really efficient as far as the appreciation of
complex merger operations. This Court will have a look with
respect to procedure rules, motivations, material
exactitudes of the facts, and absences of manifest mistakes
in the appreciation. ^-^^
In fact, the Court has a tendency to intervene only
when it has to correct the Commission definition of the
relevant market. It is only at this point that the Court's
will really enter the economic debate. -'-^^ Nonetheless, the
Court Jurisprudence will remain fundamental, because it
helps the Commission in its future decisions in the
concurrence f ield. '-'^-'- As there has been a significant
increase of the Commission's powers, ^^^ because the
regulation eliminates the immixion of the national
competition Law, ^^-^ the adoption of this regulation is in
fact a reaffirmation of the Member States goal for a Common
Market
.
2 Relationships Between the 1989 Regulation and Articles
85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty
The Commission has definitively gained control over the
more important mergers with the 1989 regulation, but at the
same time has lost the important powers it had with Articles
85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty. -'-^^ So, two different systems
are created and articles 85 and 86 are not applicable to the
concentrations field defined by Article 3 of the
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Regulation. I'^S v\/hen the regulation was adopted, the
Commission reserved itself the right to intervene in non
European-size mergers. But, the Commission added that it did
not mean to apply Articles 85 and 86 to these mergers. ^^^
A The Commission Competence after 1989
The Commission has to face a unusual situation because,
there has been both an increasing and a decreasing of
powers, in comparison with the time when only Articles 85
and 86 were grasping this particular field. ^^"^
a Augmentation of the Commission powers
Article 3 of the Regulation gives the Commission powers
it did not have before. From now on, the Commission has
total and exclusive control upon European-size mergers. The
Commission has also the possibility to exercise its control
over mergers, before their realization. 1^°
As a result of the 1989 regulation, the national authorities
can no longer apply their national competition law to
Community- size concentrations. There will not have any
decision conflicts.
Some Authors have even been further and pointed out
that there are inconveniences to the fact that national
mergers be grasped by Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty:
both European and National Authorities have then a
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concurrent competence. The competence system will be hybrid
in this caser^^^ the national Authorities will apply their
national competition law, and the Commission applies the
European competition Law.
b Diminution of the Commission Powers
As far as mergers that do not have a European size,
Articles 85 and 86 of the European Treaty apply with all the
regulations that had been created to implement these
Articles. The 17 regulation applies in this case.
For an European-size merger, the Commission can not act
as it used to do with this regulation: it can not oblige any
more the interested enterprises to put an end to an
infraction, to extend this obligation by the mean of an
"astreinte", to put fines, oblige to give information,
verify them, and grant any exemption. ^^*^
Now, we have to see exactly what are the main
differences between the 1989 regulation and Articles 85 and
86, in their spirit. This will unable us to see the
improvements of the 1989 regulation over the Rome Treaty in
this particular field.
B Comparison of both texts
The 1989 regulation has taken the C.E.C.A Treaty
(European Community for Steel and Coal) as a model as far as
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the elaboration of the competition policy: this can be a
great help to clarify the meaning of the 1989 regulation. ^^1
The C.E.C.A dispositions apply to every operation that have
an effect on mergers. To the difference of both the 1989
Regulation and Articles 85 and 86, the C.E.C.A does not know
the criterion of "affecting the Commerce between Members
States". -^^2 Some strong links remain, nonetheless between
the 1989 regulation and Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome
Treaty.
a Convergences
Both texts tend to have the same objective, but the
European Treaty is interested in competition Law only
because it is dealing with the establishment of the Common
market. 1^2 Articles 85 and 86 do not have a purely
competition aim, but they see if the circulation freedom in
the Common market is not harmed because of ententes,
mergers, or abuses of dominant positions . ^^^ As far as the
assessment of compatibility. Article 2(l.b) picked up the
words used in Article 85 and 86, but the 1989 version
contains an additional argument: "the development of
technical and economic progress". A trend in Doctrine
suggests that there is no limitation for the choice of
criteria used in the determination of a dominant position,
but says that in fact there is more an evaluation of the
effects of this concentration.
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The regulation uses terms already employed in Articles
85 and 8 6 of the Rome Treaty: the word "dominant position"
is a relevant example of this fact. It has benefited from
the evolution of the European jurisprudence, through case
laws, and did not come up "as a new" word in the 1989
regulation.
Nonetheless, the spirit of the 1989 regulation goes
further because the Rome Treaty focuses only on whether
exchanges are harmed and, if not, the Commission is then
incompetent to intervene or to prohibit anticompetitive
practices . 15^ The 1989 regulation has a broader aim: it
tends to establish a global system to grasp European size
mergers and to draw a trend in the European construction.
b Divergences
The merger control goes much further with the 1989
regulation because article 85 only encompasses the
"reinforcement" and not the "creation" of a dominant
position by a merger. ^^^
As far as the conditions of harm to the competition,
the regulation does not make any reference to the
"affectation of intra-Community" trade that Articles 85 and
86 did. This is because during the negotiations, this
element has been considered not essential: so, according to
the Doctrine the third floor of "transnationality" is
supposed to replace it.^^'
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c The Rome Treaty Inheritage
Article 2 l.(b) is directly issued from Article 85.3 of
the Treaty, but the 1989 regulation does not say explicitly
that a derogation can be granted. ^^^
Nonetheless there is an "evolution" of this notion in
the 1989 regulation: if it is found that the merger has a
"pro-competition" effect on the Consumers, an exemption will
be granted. -^^^
After the Continental case, considerable uncertainty
remained as to the potential scope of Article 86, as an
effective element of merger control . '"^ Some concentration
operations have still been introduced on Articles 85 and 86
basis, even though they have taken place after 1989. The
Procter and Gamble cases are particularly relevant in this
meaning. ^^1 The operation in both of these cases was
introduced by a "plaint": some person outside the agreement
say that they are against the proposed merger operation (on
Articles 85 and 86 basis) , and they have to prove the
cooperative character of the operation between the two
enterprises
.
As a matter of practice, when the concerned operations
do not fit with the Article 3 conditions (even though they
are above the thresholds) , they are covered by Article 85
and 86 of the Rome Treaty. ^^-^ The Philip Moris case is
definitively in favor of the application of Article 85 in
such cases. 1^3 j^ the Baxter-Nestle case, for instance, a
common enterprise has been qualified as "cooperative", and
analyzed by the Commission on Articles 85 and 86 basis.
But, in general, the inadequacy of Articles 85 and 86
as far as the application of the merger control, has been
highlighted because "there is a need for a unique
regulation" to allow effective control of concentration.!^'^
Nonetheless, Professor Dirk Staudenmayer is in favor of the
application of Article 86 of the Rome Treaty to European-
size mergers that do not fit exactly with the 1989 European
Regulation. -^^5 But, the Author thinks that the application
of Article 85 must be excluded because the National
authorities are deemed not to be competent (through Article
88), as the Commission is not found to be competent on
Article 89 basis. Article 86 would be likely to apply as far
as acquisitions of control of a competitor by an enterprise
that is already in a dominant position, 1^^ and as far as
minority participations in the capital of a competitor.
The European Court of Justice has said that where
certain conditions exist, it would be possible to apply
Article 85 of the Rome Treaty to merger-like operations . ^^'^
The main reason seems to be that if the fact for an
enterprise is not a mere restrictive behavior, such a
participation can nonetheless be a means of influencing the
commercial behavior of the relevant enterprises . 1^8 But,
anyway, this stand-point is really controversial, and the
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majority of the Doctrine is in favor of an application of
the new regulation for merger operations.
Just after the notification by an enterprise, the
Commission will start investigating to see if the proposed
merger is likely to alter the competition at the European
level. The crucial moment is now to come: the Commission
will have to determine the relevant market of the proposed
concentration before giving its definitive opinion on the
potential abuse. A two step procedure after 1989, will then
follow: the delimitation of a market, and then the
appreciation of the different elements pointed out by the
delimitation will be set forth. It will depend upon the
Commission appreciation to give more or less weight to the
different criterions set forth. We will see that, in fact,
the delimitation of the relevant market is rather
"subjective", depending upon the result the Commission wants
to arrive at. We will start with the presumption that the
computation of the market shares held by the concerned
enterprises is insufficient to get a fair idea of the merger
potential abuse: the "relevant market" theory is then the
main technique the Commission has been using to determine
the potential abuses.
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Ill THE RELEVANT MARKET: A NECESSARY TOOL TO DETERMINE
THE ABUSES OF DOMINANT POWER
It is impossible to say whether a concentration creates
or strengthens a dominant position without positioning this
merger on a "relevant" market. The narrower the market is
defined, the more easily a dominant position will be found.
So, the choice of the elements that define the market may
not be that "objective", and can eventually lead to some
arbitrary decisions. But, at the same time, the delimitation
of this market is essential for merger control. The market
may be defined according to the goal desired by the
Commission: this can be an element of uncertainty. In a
classical view-point, the Commission analyzes the relevant
market concerning the product and the geography: the
Commission will try to see in which area the relevant
enterprise competes in homogenous conditions with its
competitors for products the consumers consider as
interchangeable . ^^^
It is necessary to become familiar with the notion of
"substitutability" and "elasticity" because they are at the
heart of the determination of the relevant market. The
Commission always mixes up the elements pointed out by this
analysis, but when it has to analyze a merger, this is not
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the only method used. The Commission will use the results of
this technique to determine the relevant market as far as
product and geography. So, although this notion is a great
help, it is only a partial means of defining the relevant
market because it does not take all the necessary elements
into account to have a fair overview of what is the relevant
market. I'^O
As far as substitutability, first of all, classically,
the Commission will try to measure the degree of
substitutability of the demand: this is to determine the
width of the market.-'-'^-'- The Commission will get a snapshot
of the market state. Then, the Commission will determine the
actual competition conditions on the market: this is the
degree of substitutability of the product. ^'^2 with this
criterion, the Commission will get to know the height of the
barriers at the market entry. This element is useful to
determine the degree of potential competition: the
probability that other competitors will come to establish,
settle in a determined market. ^"^^ The Commission has a
tendency to define the product market in a very tight way,
on the basis of the demand substitutability. ^"^^ For
instance, in the Renault case, the Commission has made a
division among trucks less than 5 tons, those between 5 to
16, and those over 16 tons.
A second category has been decided by the Commission:
it made another division on the first one between the public
transportation buses and the tourism cars.^'^^ The Promodes
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case is also especially relevant because the Coininission has
divided up the market between small specialized retailers,
small shops of less than 400 square meters offering enough
products to satisfy a low level of demand, and the medium
and big size shops of more than 400 square meters. ^'^^
Some Authors say that nonetheless, the Commission has a
tendency not to scrutinize, the elasticity of the demand in
order to determine the degree of substitutability between
the different products . ^"^"^ They say that the Commission only
takes into account the specific characteristics of products
and services with the price for a determined use.-^*^^ This
is, of course, a specific trend of the Doctrine, and it has
to be relativised because we will see that in fact, the
Commission will take into account numerous elements to
determine the relevant market.
As far as elasticity, this notion is derived from the
substitutability technique. In the analysis of the relevant
market, this element may be present and can even be
primordial. In Continental Can case for instance, the
European Court of Justice has invalidated the Commission
decision that had not seen the degree of elasticity of the
supply trend when it defined the relevant market. ^"^^
The European Court has said that there is a dominant
position on a market if the competitors of the relevant
merger can not by simple adaptation enter the market with
sufficient force to constitute a serious danger. Another
fundamental case, the Michelin case, made a reference to the
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absence of elasticity of the offer, in order to make a
difference between the tires used by trucks, and the tires
used by regular cars. Even if this theory does not determine
the market anumore, it is now essential nonetheless to
ponder the definition of the market in order to take into
account the degree of elasticity of supply and demand that
the relevant firm has to face.
1 The Market, in an European Stand-Point
A An Omnipresent Notion in European Merger Law
The "market" is an omnipresent notion in European
competition law: for instance, ententes are prohibited if
found restrictive on a "relevant" market. ^^^ The Council of
Concurrence gave this definition of "market" : it is the
place where the supply and demand for a product or a
specific service meet.-'-^^ This will allow the Commission to
evaluate the economic power of an enterprise on the market:
the Commission will be able to verify whether the concerned
enterprise creates or strengthens a dominant position. ^^2 to
remain realistic, the Commission will ask some advise from
experts, but will also be informed by economic simulations,
surveys done with the firm's competitors and with the users
of the products and services. 1^3
The definition of the market is a decisive factor of
control, but hard to handle because it is possible to define
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it according to what we want to prove about the concerned
enterprise. In fact, the larger the market is defined, the
smaller will be the market share of the enterprise that may
be on dominant position, and the less susceptible will be
the parties to be grasped by the prohibition. That is why
the notion of market share has to be definitively considered
as one of the numerous factors that can determine whether an
enterprise has a dominant position.
The assessment of concentrations under Article 2 of the
1989 regulation is primarily based upon the definition of
the relevant market. The problem is that Article 2(1) (b)
does not give any elements to define the relevant market
(product and geographic) , so the Commission was obliged to
see the trend developed in case law.l°^ And it must be
pointed out that there is there is no reference to the
geographic market, so the Commission has artificially linked
this notion with Article 9(7) that deals with the
differences between national and local markets. ^^^ It must
be definitively emphasized as well, that the delimitation of
the market, is not an end in itself. It is integrated with
the operation of merger control, and the unique purpose in
finding the market is to see if there is an abusive power on
this "relevant" market. l^^
A "dynamic" factor is now always introduced: the Commission
will take into account, in its analysis, the maturity of the
market. ^^'^
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It is must be pointed out tihat the Commission has the
"monopoly" of the relevant market definition. Moreover, it
is really difficult to approve the Commission opinion as far
as the elements of this definition: because, the procedure
of merger assessment will start with what the Commission
considers a being the "exact" definition of the market. ^^^
In fact, at the notification level, the Commission will
modify or choose the elements it wishes to take into
account; and the procedure is then prepared on the basis of
these "subjective" elements. The Commission is allowed to
consider as incomplete the information the concerned
enterprise has to give, when it does not conform as
expected. 1^5 Nonetheless, this will not bar the procedure
from starting . ^^'^
We have seen that the definition of the relevant market
does not necessarily reflect reality: the Commission
analysis can be very subjective when it tends to a specific
aim.-^^-^ And, the aim here, is an appreciation of an
enterprise power: an economic and politic assessment is
about to take place. -^^^ Sometimes, it is possible to clearly
see the aim the Commission wants to arrive at, and the
Commission does not always try to hide the result it wants
to come about. In the Digital case, for instance, the
Commission only stated that the "personal" computers were
information systems for a single user, for private or
professional use.-^^-^ In fact, the Commission proceeded to
such an analysis because it wanted to eliminate the game
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systems from the definition of the relevant market. But
usually, the Commission analysis of the products is deeply
elaborated and comprises an important part of its decision
motivation. The Commission, in this case, finally, came to a
very simple (simplistic?) division between the small and
large computers (the price of the different computers has
also been an important factor). ^^^
B The Market Share: an Insufficient Factor
An important trend in Doctrine said that the diminution
of the importance of the market shares lead to the rise of
the relevant market theory. In fact, for the Commission, the
market shares are not any more a decisive criterion. But,
nonetheless, to a certain extent they can be taken into
account in the determination of the relevant market.
The Competition Council even said clearly that the
market share is not a sufficient element to determine the
dominant position because other factors have to be taken
into account-^^^ A strong market share can be
"conjectural . "^^^ The authorities in spite of small shares,
often say a firm is in dominant position. For instance, in
the United Brand case, a 40 to 45% market share was deemed
not to be a sufficient proof of a dominant position (and so
not a proof of a potential abuse). ^^'
Nonetheless, it was added that a market share below 20%
was definitive proof of an absence of possible dominant
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position. In this case, the market share factor is used as a
minimum. So, the Commission's first procedural step is to
determine the relevant market, in order to decide whether
there is a dominant position. Most of the times, the
Commission proceeds in a rather traditional: it considers
the product and the geographic area to find the relevant
market of the proposed merger. The Commission remains
attached to the product and geographic market definition. -^^^
2 The Product Market
The 1989 regulation does not say exactly which elements
have to be taken into account to determine this market. The
only indications are set up in the Section 5 of CO paper.
This text says that "a product market" grasps all the
products or services that the consumers consider as
interchangeable or substitutable, because of their
characteristics, price, or their use.-^^° The CO definition
of the relevant product market sets forth a demand side
factor. It excludes supply factors, contrary to the European
Court of Justice's holding under Article 86 in the
Continental Can case.^OO in practice, the analysis of the
supply substitutability has been very important, and the ABC
case^Ol is essentially based on this analysis. ^02
The Commission referred to a supply-side factor in the
Viag case: in particular, it highlighted the different uses
of raw materials and manufacturing technical and equipment
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that made it difficult for many to switch production in the
context of glass, plastic, and metal packaging. ^^^
There is no indication, however, that this will become the
trend. The decisions rendered so far, indicate that the
Commission will normally arrive at a relatively narrow
relevant market product definition based on its assessment
of demand substitutability as conditioned by the product
technical characteristics, price, and intended use.204
It must be recognized that the Commission has not
created much in comparison with the former jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, there is a difference now, because more stress
is put on the evolution of the supply and demand trend, and
on the evolution of the technical progress: the Commission
seems to have adopted since 1989 a dynamic analysis of the
market .205
The existence of "substitutable" products was not
initially included by the Commission in the relevant product
market. But, since the Tetra case, the degree of
substitutability played a major role in the Commission
decision. 206 j^ ^^s analyzed as very high in this case: some
pretty similar products manufactured by several firms could
fulfill the same uses with little adaptation in fields as
various as the brewery or food industry areas. 207 r^-j^Q
Commission, that will scrutinize the products as far as their
proprieties, price, use, will see in fact if the products
are subsituable in the consumers' mind. 208 This issue will
be the most important challenge of the Commission
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decision. The Commission will constantly have to balance and
decide which factor is prominent . 209 This attitude can give
rise to unexpected decisions from the Commission's part. For
instance, the Commission has often estimated that even a new
entity had the capacity to be particularly powerful in a
sector that is likely to be one of the most important in the
relevant market. ^-^0 -phe CO paper distinguishes three
different elements as far the definition of the product
market
.
A Characteristics of the Products
The particular qualities of the concerned product will
be scrutinized. In the United Brand case, the "specific"
qualities of the banana (exterior, taste, consistence,
transportation, continuous level of production satisfying an
important part of the population (babies, old persons, sick
people) have been pointed out.^H The Commission has noticed
that the banana could be separated from the other fruits as
far as its qualities and so, the market has been divided up
into the fresh fruit market and the banana market. ^^2
A brand can consitute a particular product
characteristic. The English "monopoly and merger"
Commission has decided that two holders of two different
trademarks needed different markets, because of the high
fidelity of the consumers as far as these particular
trademarks .213
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An analysis of the product components is most of the
time thoroughly and carefully effectuated: the Renault
case214 ^^g particularly relevant as far as the truck
market
.
If the evaluation of the substitutability degree is
done according to the economic theory that compares all the
technical characteristics of the relevant products, these
characteristics are not considered for themselves. The
theory estimates that they only show the real preferences of
the consumers. This theory is one of the few that take into
account the traditions of the profession, to distinguish the
markets. 2 15
B Use of the Products
In order for the products to be in the same market,
they need to be exactly for the same use. 21° in the Hoffman
Laroche case, a division of the markets has been made as far
as the use of the concerned pharmaceutical products. The
Commission has made a distinction in the vitamin market,
between the technologic vitamin market (additives) and the
bionutritive vitamins (used in food and for pharmacy
purposes) . ^^'^
An adequate example of such a distinction can also be
found in the Michelin case. This "use" factor has been the
source of a distinction between touristic cars and trucks,
in order to exclude the tires sold with a little defect
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("rechappe" ) .218 This was because the "private" consumers
use these kind of tires in only a limited way. So, we see
that the "second-hand" aspect of the tires could by itself
divide up the market. The more controversial ''use-division
"of the market took place in the Aerospatiale case.^l^
Some Authors thought that the helicopter market
division made up by the Commission was kind of artificial.
In fact, the market has been merely and simplistically split
up between civil and military planes. This has been done in
spite of the strong and clear links between both categories:
the civil planes are derived from the military ones. 220
Then, the Commission operated a second distinction once
this first made. The military market was thus divided up in
seat segments, because the Commission found that homogenous
competition conditions took place inside of each of the
delimited segments. An analysis of the substitutability has
been made before dividing as such: the different seats
segments were found not to be substitutable . 221 The reason
is that a regulation in the principal concerned countries
requires a second hostess when there are more than 50 seats,
and, to comply with this modification raises considerably
and effectively the exploitation costs. So, a dominant
position can be exercised only inside of the three
groups. 222 The Commission did not take into account, in its
reasoning, the arguments of the parties proving that in
eight precise cases, there was a real competition between two
planes appertaining in two different product markets.
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The boldest "use-distinction" of the market took place
in the Tetra Pak case.^^^ Even tough the finished products
were exactly similar, the Commission has made such an "end-
use" distinction. So, the use of glass or plastic (to hold
the products) were not found substitutable with carton,
because of the potential differences of transportation fees
and also because of environmental concerns. ^2 4 sq, we can
see that the choice of elements that may define the market,
are fully subjective.
The precise degree of substitution is not clear. And
the Commission has not established a precise guideline in
this particular area. And sometimes, the Commission draws a
"use-division" of the market, and then divides up again the
concerned market, depending on the followed aim! For
instance, in the Sanofi22 5 case, the Commission has excluded
of the "use-divided" market, some products, because, even if
they were perfectly interchangeable in the concerned segment
of the market, some products were not registered for a
therapeutic use.
More over, it is possible that some products fully
substitutable in theory be not considered as substitutable
in an economic view-point: they are not considered as being
in the market of the relevant product. For instance,
National regulations that limit the production or the
selling of a product in the European Community are to take
into account for that. The Commission took the "siglucose"
out of the refined sugar market. 226 -po determine the
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substitutability of the products as far as their use, the
Commission has also taken into account technical
instructions, 227and the "effective" use228 Qf ^he product.
C The Product Prices
This analysis is a complement of the first two factors.
If clients pay different prices for a product they consider
substitutable because of its characteristics, and its use,
they will be in distinct markets. The general trend of the
Doctrine says that this criterion has a limited scope
because it only takes into account the price, as a factor of
mobility in the consumers' behavior and mind. 229
The price factor is in function of the cross-
elasticity of the demand. 2-^^ If a price on a market is very
high, for instance as it can be in a monopoly, some products
that are theoretically not substitutable, are likely to
appear as being sufficiently substitutable. ^-^^
3 The Geographical market
The geographical market is much more delicate to
determine, and the Commission had the hardest time dealing
with this factor because of the imperfect integrated
interior market. ^32 <phe European market is in fact, not yet
integrated and so the geographic market is not yet
considered as the whole European Community. There are still
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a lot of "national" markets in spite of the theoretical
inexistence of barriers in the European Community . ^^^ And,
there is no minimal geographical scope for the determination
of the market. A "region" of a state Member, if it is
sufficiently developed (population, level of resources,
importance of the buying power...) can be this "substantial
part" described in the 1989 regulation. ^^'^ And, a "commune"
can fit also in this definition. ^35 sq^ ^he Commission will
try to grasp the particularities of the market, when facing
a merger problem. Its job is to isolate an area (a
substantial part) in the whole European market, where
competition conditions are exercised in an homogenous way.
In trying to find the geographical market, the question
the Commission will raise is where do the relevant
enterprises exercise their dominant power? The "relevant"
enterprises are the ones that have substitutable products or
services: the Commission will try now to draw a geographic
border line. The Commission will wonder: where exactly do
the firms have a strong power?: where is their real economic
power? The Commission will look for an area where the
competition conditions are sufficiently homogenous for the
effects of the economic power of the concerned undertaking
to be able to be evaluated. ^3 6 This question comes up: who .
exactly are the competitors? The Commission will try to look
for all the enterprises that fit with this criterion: they
will be considered as being part of the same geographical
market. 237 rpj^g enterprises that are in the same geographical
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market do not need to be close from each other: for the
Commission, the most important element is the influence of
the enterprises on the product market already defined.
The firms will be considered as competitors when, for
instance, because of an price augmentation in one
enterprise, the consumers will buy in a farther
enterprise . ^-^^ So, even some far away enterprises can be
incorporated by the Commission in the relevant geographic
market definition: the firms susceptible to augment their
production in a brief delay in order to respond to the
demand of some clients (victims of an abuse of dominant
power), will be considered as competitors . 239 The Commission
refers to the national preferences , ^40 local technical
specifications, international regulations, 2'*-^ the importance
of adaptation costs, the existence of rules or different
practices
.
Article 2(3), addresses indirectly the geographical
market, and does not say if the Commission might look
outside the Common market when trying to find the geographic
relevant market . The Authors have interpreted these words as
limiting only the territorial competence of the
Commission. 242 Article 2(1. a) says that the Commission takes
into account, in making its appraisal, the actual or
potential competition from undertakings located either
within or without the Community. So, it might be thought
that the Commission has the possibility to take such a world
market as a geographical criterion: it is in fact, an
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essential factor. 243 Tj^e relevant geographical market can
be as huge as the world, even though the study of the
potential abuse of dominant power will have necessarily a
European setting. The aim being the maintain of an effective
competition on the Common market, the enterprises influence
will be measured on this particular area.244 -p^e European
market is the only decisional criterion as far as the
appreciation of compatibility with the Common market and,
the world market may be taken into account.
With the trade internationalization, the Commission
will be now more likely to compare the European firms with
the world market. The enterprises that do not have a
dominant position on the world market are not likely to have
a dominant position on the Community market, if the
concerned territory is only a regional segment of the world
market. 245 g^^- sometimes, the Commission appraisal of the
geographic European market, can lead to weird results. For
instance, in the Tetra Pak case, the Commission found the
geographic market to be the entire Europe. 246 rpj^g Commission
came to this result even though the demand varied slightly
among Member States. But in fact, there was a significant
market for every kind of packaging and filling machines in
each State, and the transportations costs did not cause
barriers to erect along National boundaries . 247
The finding of a dominant market has been found to be
due to five factors: a large market share, an early
development of the UHT technology, a vast experience and
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protection by various patents, and the maturity state of the
milk market. 248 p^ important issue, in the construction of
the European market has dealt with an eventual admission of
"European" champions .The concentration of two or three
enterprises already in dominant position as far as products
can not be justified in the perspective of exterior markets,
but the concentration that leads to a substantial market
share on the Community can be necessary in a world
setting. ^49
As far as national markets, they do not seem to have
disappeared in spite of the European market integration. ^50
A national market can be defined as a space where
competition conditions are homogenous and different from
those of the other Member States. ^^^ The Commission will
often conclude that the market is national when it has
different evolution steps. ^52 And, the Commission has also
found some "local" markets. The Accor case, Promodes and
Spar cases are particularly relevant in this stand-point.
But, it might be pointed out that the Commission has many
times said that the geographical market did not deal with
the whole community: in the Promodes case, a local market
has been found as far as the selling of alimentary products
and non-alimentary products by supermarkets . ^ 53 rpj^g
necessity to get some local production units and the
transportation difficulties have been taken into account. In
this case, the different traditional transportation means
have been scrutinized, along with the demand structure.
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because it was necessary to determine if the distribution
market was local or regional . ^^'^
In order to decide in favor of a "local" market, the
Commission generally invokes transportation constraints, and
the socio-economic characteristics of the localities . ^55 j^
fact, an emphasis on local particularities has been put in
numerous Commission decisions. This goes against the United
Brand Doctrine^SS that incited the Commission to grasp a
rather large territory . 2^'
The mere fact to take local particularities into
account also seems to be contrary to the Commission analysis
of the relevant geographic market in the Pompes funebres
case, and in the Alsatel case.258 j^ the Alsatel case, for
instance, the Court held France to be the relevant market.
But some Authors thought that it was a rather weird decision
because Alsatel 's activities were limited to Alsace (an
"region" in France) .259 This "local" criterion also goes
against the Tetra Pak case and the Hilti case. In the Tetra
Pak case, the Community was defined as the relevant
geographic market despite the facts, that preferences as to
packagings existed in different States members. ^60 p^^ ^^
the Hilti case, the Community market was held to be the
geographical relevant market. But in fact, it must be
pointed out that although the Commission did not publish the
market share data in its decision, it is certain that
Hilti 's market share was not the same throughout the
Community; and even, in France it was far from being the
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market leader. ^^^ So, we might wonder if the taken into
account of a geographical criterion is appropriate in a more
and more integrated market that tries to have a unique
European setting. The Doctrine has even been wondering if
Article 9(7) of the 1989 regulation had still some practical
consequences .2 62
Once the geographical market initially delimited, the
Commission is likely to tend to "physically" modify the
original scope of it. 2 63 sq^ ^he Commission has been seen
numerous times, to reduce artificially the market, when it
estimates that the existence of some barriers reduce it. The
Alcatel case is particularly relevant in this aspect. 264 j^
this case, the Commission has reduced the scope of the
market to the intra-Community trade because of the
difference of technical norms in the field of
telecommunication. 2 65 This criterion seems difficult to
handle because there are still some restructuration problems
on the European market. So, the Commission has said that the
short term development will not be included an element of
enlargement of the relevant national market. 266
On the other hand, the Commission also takes into
account the potential or future development of the markets,
to enhance or reduce the geographical market. 267 pQj^
instance, in the Renault case, the Commission took into
account the future opening of the national markets in the
bus sector in the public transportation. 268 ^he potential
competition of the foreign productors is also likely to
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limit the economic power of the relevant enterprise on the
geographical market. ^^^
The Michelin case was at the origin of the beginning of
a new analysis by the Commission, and is an important
element of development in the European jurisprudence on
mergers . 2''''-' This case is often quoted for helding that the
Commission should not limit itself to the objective
characteristics of the relevant products and consider other
criterions . So, now the Commission has a tendency to use
more often all the possibilities proposed by the 1989
regulation. We can wonder if this trend constitutes a brand
new way of concentration assessment (because sometimes there
are not any more references to the "relevant market"), or if
the Commission only renews the classical market theory by
adding other factors in its analysis? The third part of this
study will focus on this aspect.
IV IS THE RELEVANT MARKET THE ONLY THEORY FOR MERGER
ASSESSMENT?
After the Michelin case, the Commission did not feel
any more limited to a "classical" analysis of the market. In
this Chapter, we will see which other elements the
Commission has a tendency to consider in its analysis, and
we will wonder if these elements are part of a renewal of
the classical market theory, or if they can constitute a new
theory that does not deal at all with the market. Our
analysis will show that the Common market competition Law
recognizes a full range of dominance indicators besides the
classical relevant market analysis.
We are still considering the first step of the
Commission analysis: the finding of a determined setting
that unables the Commission to say that the proposed merger
has a dominant position. The second step will not be entered
into: we will not scrutinize the way the Commission
appraises the proposed merger and ponders the different
elements
.
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1 Has the classical "relevant market" method any gaps?
As the market share and the determination of the
relevant market seem to be insufficient methods to have a
fair idea of the power of the proposed merger, the
Commission has been tempted to take into account numerous
other elements to get a more acute idea of the competition
setting. Complementary factors have been taken into account,
sometimes without any links with the market. This position
shows that the market (classically seen) is definitively an
imperfect factor of concentration assessment .^71 a new trend
has been observed: the Commission has more and more taken
into account the maturity state of the economic activities
or factors that are outside the product. ^72
Sometimes, the product itself is even forgotten, and
the Commission focuses on its "surroundings" (the
commercialization network for instance) . So, we can wonder
sometimes if there are still any more links with the
product? Is it possible to speak of a certain
"desincorporation" of the product? The notion of product is
so refined now, that it has been divided up into three
"desincorporated" functions (outside the product) : the
selling, council advice, and the buying of the product are
analyzed separately . ^"^-^ Now, the Commission in fact
describes more the market as a place where an activity is
exercised than a place where a product is.274 Some
cases are particularly relevant of this Commission stand-
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Moreover, the decoupages of the economic activity by
product, is not found to stop the economic power of the big
enterprises of distribution that only control tiny markets
for each products they sell. ^81 This is because in reality,
they have some power through their global activity. ^^2
So, it seems better to position the relevant
enterprises on one or several markets and to measure their
economic power with indices relative to the structure of
these markets. Because the only purpose of an enterprise is
not only to maximize its benefits, a classical analysis of
the market does not take into account other parameters The
European Court of Justice said that a dominant enterprise
can diminish its prices to pressure its competitors ! ^83 now,
the Commission often focuses on the effects of the potential
merger on competition, without before determining the
product284 g^j^^ geographical market. 2°5 rphe Commission
approach is nonetheless still unclear in spite of all the
efforts to point out a firm guideline in this field.
2 The renewal of the relevant market theory by the
Commission
After the Michelin case and the United Brand case, a
lot of complementary indices are linked with this idea of
new criterions . 286 Now, the Commission will take in its
analysis a multitude of different elements that will unable
it to determine the potential abuse of dominant position.
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A- A new look at the Competition conditions
The Commission is more and more likely to take into
account these new criteria because of the future total
market integration, which will render far less significant
the existence of large market shares in certain Member
States. 287
The Commission is then more tempted to authorize
mergers that attempt to adjust to large internal markets or
that are linked with technological developments leading to a
redefinition of the product market. 2°8 p^^ times, the
Commission will only focus on one of the following aspects,
when analyzing the merger position.
a- The maturity state of the competition
a-1 Existence and evolution of potential entrants on the
relevant market:
The existence of potential entrants is an essential
factor that helps to diminish the power of the potential
merger on the market. In the Tetra case, for instance, the
Commission tried to determine the potential entrants on the
Common market, in order to see if the threat was strong
enough to prevent Tetra from acting in an appreciable
manner. The technological content of the product is closely
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scrutinized, because the state of development of the
searches or patents are helpful to see how potential
competitors will be able to produce the same product with
the same technical expertise. ^^^ In its analysis, it will
take into account the technologic rate, to give an accurate
idea of the real possible entrants on the relevant
market. 290 jf ^he number of competitors who are about to
enter the market, is very low, the Commission is likely to
find the potential merger in dominant position.
The evolution of potential competitors can constitute
the main issue for the Commission. This criterion is
different from the analysis of the actual competition,
because there is an incertainty to whether the merger will
be realized and when.^^l The Commission will investigate
whether the entry of potential competitors is possible,
probable, and sufficient (as far as intensity) , and with
delay that prohibits the augmentation of prices or obligates
the relevant enterprises to have a competitor . 292
a-2 - The actual or potential competition outside the
Community
These elements are analyzed to understand the strenght
of the position of the relevant firm in the international
competition setting. Most of the Authors link this factor
with Article 2(1. a) of the 1989 regulation. This article
gave rise to numerous interpretations. The Commission used
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this portion of text to take into account the actual or
potential competition outside the Community. In fact, the
Commission will consider the international competition side,
to see if the potential merger is able to give rise to an
abuse of dominant power. This factor is mainly used to
diminish the effect of this merger, in relativizing it, in a
European or world setting.
In the Rhone-Poulenc case, and in the Ibercobre case,
the Commission has relied on the existence of imports from
outside the Community, to arrive at a finding that dominance
would not have adverse effects on the considered geographic
area. 293 j^ saying so, the Commission did not include the
countries from which imports originated in the concerned
area. ^^^
b- The competition structure:
b-1- A need to preserve and develop an effective competition
The 1989 regulation refers to such a need, making the
Commission analysis being not only spatial but also
temporal. 29^ So, the Commission will take into account the
performance of the enterprises over time and also the future
developments of the relevant society. ^96 Therefore, the
possibilities of short term benefits or losses have been
taken into account. ^^^ This criterion has been taken into
account because the market is not a sufficient factor to see
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the reality of the competition setting. The Authorities have
taken into account such complementary factors, that are
here, without any direct link with the market. ^98
b-2-The competition structure
After 1989, the Commission was more likely to take into
account the competition structure than to look into the mere
behavior of the relevant enterprise. For the Commission,
now, the competition state is fundamental: it will look
deeply into the European, International, US and Japanese
competition levels. The analysis an inreasing tendency to be
located within the International setting. ^99 And, sometimes,
the Commission has distinguished the relevant product by
taking into account only the competition conditions . ^'^'^ For
instance, in the Magnetti case, the Commission, following
this criterion, has distinguished between the new car
batteries and the second-hand ones.-^*-*!
It did not make this distinction according to a
difference of product, but mainly as far as the competition
conditions. On the second-hand market, the competition
conditions differ markedly from new product market: in the
second-hand market, the clients are small groups of people
in the car industry field, while new product encompasses
private persons . ^'-'2
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b-3 The commercialization network
The means of commercialization is an important element
that helps the Commission determine if the relevant
potential merger is likely to be found in dominant position.
For instance, the Commission will be able to see with this
factor, if the firm has such a specificity as to be create a
special advantage and power such as to exert too much strong
influence on the relevant setting. 303 So, the distribution
network can constitute a special criterion to be taken into
account. In some cases, the Commission will emphasize this
aspect and take it mainly into account. In the
Dermopharmacie case, the distribution network aspect has
been highlighted: in fact it constituted the main factor of
determination of the Commission. 304
In this case, there were no real technical
specificities as far as the products, but the mere fact that
the product was sold only in pharmacy seemed relevant for
the Commission, to isolate it from similar products
distributed in Department Stores. The products sold in
pharmacy, in fact, have such a strong reputation that they
often give the goods their very own specif icity. -^05 j^ survey
has been made to check if the product had a specificity due
to the way of distribution: it has revealed that the buyers
for pharmacy products are in search of purity and advise:
they think that they will find these elements in real
"pharmacies" and not department stores. -^^^
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The Coiranission found the product not substitable for
the reason that in France there is a monopoly of the
pharmaceutical field. Moreover, the prices of the products
on this distribution network are lower than those of the
liixury shops and higher than those made in chain
distributions. These elements are objective elements that
support the market specificity. ^'^'^
The Commission also took into account the distribution
network when it considered mergers involving books. For
instance, in the France Loisir case, the Commission
reproached to the Court of Appeals for not having
established that the selling of books by clubs formed an
economically sufficient market. •^'^° It considered that the
category of books sold by clubs should be isolated from the
general book market. The market of the selling by clubs was
then considered to be a specific reference market. We see
that a particular way of commercialization can constitute a
specific product and create a different and separate market
that will be considered on its own .
B- A new geographical analysis
In fact, in most cases, the Commission does not
determine the relevant geographical market because it thinks
that it has enough criteria to get a fair idea of the
proposed operation compatibility . ^^^ This new position is
totally contrary to a trend in doctrine that wants to take
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more the national and local markets into account. The
determination of a local market corresponds to a need for a
dynamic vision of a market in order to anticipate the
consequences of measures taken by the enterprises . ^^'^
a- the barriers at the entrance
The more barriers, the stronger the competition is,-3H
the less the operations will be likely to be compatible . -^^2
In the Havilland case, for instance, the compatibility of
the dominant position was determined in scrutinizing the
importance of the barriers within the designated
geographical area. The barriers at the market entrance are
various: they can be a slow return on investment , -^^^ the
existence of national approved and exclusive agreements, the
existence of distributor prices and consumer prices, ^^'^ the
cost and rapidity of an installation, -^^^ differences in
legislation, and transportation fees.^^" The adaptation to
technical norms can also be a barrier: The "White Book"
already mentioned it.
The Viag case, was a relevant case in this view point:
it referred mainly to the costs of change from plastic
bottles to glass bottles . -^^"^ In the Alcatel case, the
Commission considered also the adaptation costs in the
telecommunication field. ^^^ The Renault case focused on the
adaptation costs to local specifications, for the buses
destined for public transportation. ^^^ A barrier at the
67
entry can also be a production cost of an enterprise that
wishes to enter. -^^O
The more common and frequent barriers are entry
barriers. They form obstacles that render impossible or
difficult the penetration on the market for new competitors,
or prohibit the development of enterprises that are already
in the relevant market. -^^-^
Three kinds of entry barriers can be considered: the
first one is found by the Commission in analyzing the
consumer view-point, or preferences. The trademark is the
example of an entry barrier in which consumers are likely to
focus on their national market instead of looking for goods
outside of it. -^22 >p]-^g buying of a product according to its
trademark diminishes the actual and potential competition in
the relevant area.-^^-^
The second barrier is constituted by a quality
criterion. In the consumer's mind, the only source of
loyalty can be constituted by certain particular
products . -^2 '^ Some consumers can remain loyal to a product
without differentiating the quality. They avoid the cost of
the transaction they would have to pay if they would look
for a better price with another manufacturer . ^25 j^ must
be pointed out that in the actual state of Community
integration, the national products are more likely to be
sold than any other products from other European countries.
So, the Commission had to adjust to these facts, and it
looks to see whether there is enough transparency on the
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market as far as the selling procedure and the equality
between National manufacturers . -^-^^
The third barrier consists of technical barriers that
can be set up at the market entrance. -^27 some cases have
focused particularly on this point:, for instance, intra-
Community sells were deemed to be economically impracticable
in the case of mail retail sells of products that are not
food. 328 This is because of the differences of languages,
delays (...) for a product to go in another country. -^29
In the United Brand case, a catalog of plausible
barriers to competition was drafted to enable the Commission
to see indicators of dominance . 330 The Commission has seen
that there is an exceptionally heavy capital requirement for
establishing and maintaining banana acreage because of the
diseases that have forced successive shifts in growing
areas. The Commission has also noticed the importance of
recurrent blowdowns and floods that threaten important
sources of supply and safety insurance . 331 The Commission
has finally concluded that an exceptionally demanding
distribution logistic creates barriers that renders
impossible for a competitor to enter the market
efficiently. -^-^^
b- The public regulations
Public regulations in European countries can alter the
original definition of the geographical market. The
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Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez case is a relevant example of this
aspect. While analyzing the acquisition of the Merlin
society by Lyonnaise des eaux Dumez, the Commission has
divided up the markets between the water markets (run in a
semi-public way) , and the markets that could be run
directly. -^-^^
C- A new considerations for some persons
a- The Consumers
The Commission now analyses differently the products in
function of the persons that can be harmed by the proposed
concentration. In the Otto case^-^^ and in the La Redoute
case-^3 5^ t-^e Commission focused on the probable effects of
the concentration operation on consumers that could
potentially be hurt. In the La Redoute case, the Commission
said that the retail sells should not be considered as a
whole, but in function of every group of people as far as
clothes are concerned. This gave rise to a division of
markets according to this element. 33 6
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the merger
European policy is less oriented towards consumer welfare,
because the creation of an integrated market remains the
major task. 337
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b- The Competitors
The capacity of production of the competitors is
generally scrutinized by the Commission with respect to two
aspects . ^3 8 _rpj-^e first element is the state of maturity of
the market. In the Digital case^-^^ for instance, the
Commission said that strong market shares are not that
important when such a factor as a very important capacity of
production of the competitors is involved. 340 In this case,
the Doctrine has even said that big market shares did not
mean an acquisition of a "market power" because of the
frequency of changes of market leaders. ^41
But, when the market is mature, the Commission will
agree, most of the time, to a new concentration because the
new penetrating entity faces an already settled
competition. -^^2 on the other hand, the Commission will have
a look at the "health" of the market. For instance, in the
Fiat case, even though this firm was exercising a particular
strong power, the Commission focused on the production
capacity of the competitors and said that Fiat did not have
any dominant position. 343
But it must be pointed out that in this case, the
decreasing of sells by Fiat and the necessity to restructure
the sector to find a solution for the "surplus" were also
taken into account in the Commission decision. ^^^
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D- The objectives of the Rome Treaty: a subjective
criterion?
The nxomber 13 recital dealing with the realization of
the fundamental objectives of the Article 2 of the Rome
Treaty has been extremely important in the Commission
analysis of the proposed merger. In fact this text is rather
vague, and so the Commission used it to interpret it in the
way it wished. The Commission interpreted broadly the notion
of development of the economic and social cohesion of the
Community to accept or not the proposed merger or not.-^^^
The weight to be attached to the various criteria
remains uncertain. In order to increase the predictability
of decisions concerning market power, the European law
should resort more to economic analysis, even if it is very
difficult to gather reliable and complete data, in order to
ensure the utility of the conclusions.
A trend of the Doctrine has seen that a solution to
such uncertainty might be found trough a comparison of both
European Merger Law and American Merger Law because of a
more rational US point of view. But, it might be pointed out
that Merger control Statutes in Europe and in the United
States were driven originally by opposite legislative
intents. With Article 7 of the Clayton Act, Congress wanted
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to halt the wave of concentrations, and in Europe, a strong
will to establish a single and coherent test for the
legality of European size mergers motivated the 1989
regulation. ^^^
The methods are also very different: the European
merger control wants to consider all the factors pertaining
to the relevant market before declaring a merger
incompatible with the Common market; and in the States, a
presumption of illegality for mergers that combine an
"undue" percentage of the market, is set up.-^^"^ The
Commission has felt the need for a clarification of the 1989
regulation as far as bringing less subjectivity in the
merger assessment.
Six years after the creation of this merger regulation,
it i possible to be sure only that the importance of
criteria other than market share will normally decrease as
market share increases. And this rule will be subject to
corrections depending upon each particularity of the
markets
.
A more direct way to measure the power of a potential
concentration has been proposed, and seems to be able to fit
in numerous cases. Instead of positioning the merger on a
market, it has been proposed to analyze only its potential
performance. 3'^^ It is possible to verify if the enterprise
has a monopoly power by examining the level of its selling
price. Every monopoly has been said to have a tendency to
augment its benefits, and to increase its output. Its
73
selling prices are generally much higher than the price of
the market
.
This trend of Doctrine has said that it is possible to
check if the proposed concentration could abuse its power on
the market, by srutinizing the level of the prices of the
new entity. Nevertheless, the European Community is still
waiting for a definitive answer to the problem of
concentration assessment.
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